In today’s Big Ask, we asked 11 experts how the UK could augment its nuclear forces

✍️David Blagden, Gabriel Elefteriu FRAeS, Euan Graham, Harry Halem, Three wise monkeys, Tomas Jermalavicius, Lukasz Kulesa, Dr Jenny Mathers @jgmaber.bsky.social, Eoin McNamara, James Rogers, Peter Watkins
geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world…

The PM holds to camera a message that is the opposite of what his ministers have conveyed in AUSMIN exchanges. The wings of the paperclip have been folded back so as not to blur that message—which is, unhelpfully, ‘ban the bomb’.

Since ICAN have been doing the Canberra rounds, worth Rod Lyon’s excellent article from last year, laying out the problems with the nuclear disarmament approach in an era of rising strategic tensions, and Australia’s need for extended nuclear deterrence: aspistrategist.org.au/australia-the-…

A fascinating + well-researched brief from The Asan Institute on ROK perceptions of the adequacy of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.

In short: not good at all.

en.asaninst.org/contents/compa…

Authors indicate that more changes to the US nuclear posture and dialogue may be needed.

A great photo, in which PM and FM display different levels of enthusiasm for messaging by document…

Thread

Thread

New Commentary Alert!

CSIS Syd Seiler analyzes the 2024 IC Annual Threat Assessment, offering insights on North Korea's missile advancements, the strengthening ties between Russia and DPRK, the likelihood of nuclear tests, and much more!

Read here ⬇️
csis.org/analysis/2024-…

Politics with Michelle Grattan: Cyber expert Lesley Seebeck on TikTok’s future in Australia theconversation.com/politics-with-… via The Conversation - Australia + New Zealand

„The only thing we can do is invest massively in our own security, and not just hope for Michigan voters to make the choice we prefer“.
Benjamin Haddad on point.

The German nuclear debate re-revisited - check out my latest for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

A quick 🧵

thebulletin.org/2024/03/german…

The strategic importance of small—really small—islands.

Kim doesn’t say so, but the alliance lets us wield military power with careful precision. Under Plan B, our military power seems likely to be more ‘lumpy’, and the escalation paths shorter…

Former defence minister and ambassador to the US: ‘If Trump is elected, will Australia need a plan B?’ | Kim Beazley | aspistrategist.org.au/former-defence… via @aspi_org

Verónica Bäcker-Peral and Gene Park look at how partisan cues can shape voters' attitudes toward allies. tnsr.org/2023/10/allian…

The tyranny of the minority.

CDF Angus Campbell 'stated he was accountable for the lamentable situation of Col Navila. But how that accountability will be exercised remains unclear. It appears to be a form of accountability that is consequence free, which empties the idea of meaning' strategicanalysis.org/defence-fallin…

When NATO was last a really serious military alliance the US had 1000s of nuclear weapons in Europe and Britain and France had arsenals. Basically all the major Western powers not in the Axis had them.

NATO today is much larger but has a much thinner nuclear umbrella.

'The...cost estimate for the airdrop missions [in Bosnia] was conservatively $2,800 per ton delivered...Compared to the cost of a truck at $25 per ton delivered, using aircraft to provide HA [aid] is clearly not a cost effective way to provide relief' apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA42…

The only outlandish thing is to dismiss out of hand that nuclear proliferation pressure is increasing rapidly and the value of NPT compliance is declining as the nuclear taboo vanishes next to alliance incoherence. Schelling would enjoy the semiotics. I do.